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MEASURING MARKET POWER WITH VARIABLES 
OTHER THAN PRICE 
Lynn Hunnicutt, Dee Von Bailey, and Michelle Crook 
ABSTRACT 
111 
Beef packing has becOlue an extreluely concentrated industry, yet studies have found that 
little, if any, market power exists. We propose and test alternative measures of behavior that luay 
better describe how packers control purchases from feedlots, using confidential data collected by the 
USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Adluinistration. 
MEASURING MARKET POWER WITH VARIABLES 
OTHER THAN PRICE* 
1 Introduction 
Concentration in the beef packing industry has been rising for the past 25 years. This has 
generated both concern among policymakers and interest froin academic economists about the 
ability of packing plants to exploit their Inarket position by influencing the conditions under 
which they purchase live cattle. Several studies of oligopsony power in beef packing have led 
to Inixed results (see Azzam (1998) for an overview of this literature). SOlne studies find a small 
but significant degree of market power (Bhuyan and Lopez (1997), Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson 
(1993), Schroeter (1987), Schroeter and Azzam (1990)), while others find no evidence that 
packers are able to exploit their position in the purchase of fed cattle (Azzam and Park (1993), 
Morrison (1997), Muth and Wohlgenant (1998)). 
In most studies, exercise of market power is defined as the ability of packing firms to 
reduce the price they pay for their inputs below a competitive level. 1 Unfortunately, without 
further assuInptions, one cannot know what prices would be if the industry were 
"competitive." Most studies solve this problem by noting that packer costs detennine what a 
competitive level of prices would be. They then use an estimate of costs based on input 
prices paid, processing costs, and marginal value product. However, as is well known, costs 
and marginal value product are quite difficult to measure accurately, let alone obtain from 
packing finns. Alternatively, some studies examine the path of prices over tiIne, looking for 
collusive behavior among packing firms (see, for example, Koontz et al. (1993), Weliwita and 
Azzam (1996), Azzam and Park (1993)). However, these studies are not able to characterize 
the degree of Inarket power which packers may possess, since they do not involve estilnating 
2 
what con1petitive prices would be. Instead, they give evidence as to whether packers do (or 
do not) use a par ticular collusive strategy to maintain the price of fed beef below what it 
would be in a competitive level. 
Given t he n1easurement problems and the mixed results obtained thus far, we suggest 
that alternatives to traditional market power measures should be examined. To that end, 
we create a statistic designed to explore the geographic and temporal relationships between 
packers and the feedlots from which they purchase. We are able to avoid the problem of 
knowing what competitive prices would be by using an indirect measure of packer behavior 
that is related to the exercise of market power but does not need coot and marginal value 
product data. Instead, our statistic is based on the proportion of its sales a particular 
feedlot makes to a given packer. This is easy to quantify if appropriate data are available. 
Our statistic allows us to classify feedlots as having an exclusive relationship with one or 
more packing plants. This gives an indirect measure of potential packer market power, since 
a packing plant may have more control over the terms of sale when it is a feedlot 's major (or 
only) customer. Our underlying hypothesis is that packers may control their cattle supplies 
by developing exclusive relationships with particular feedlots. If there is limited overlap 
among these relationships, then packers may have the ability to control terms of sale as 
well. In effect, exclusive relationships may explain why the market for fed beef differs from 
a perfectly competitive market. 
The idea of feedlot loyalty is related to notions of captive supplies. One theory of 
the relationship between packing firms and their suppliers suggests packers capture needed 
supplies through contractual arrangements with feedlots (Schroeder, Mintert and Barkley 
(1993) , Hayenga and O'Brien (1992), Ward, Koontz , Dowty, Trapp and Peel (1999) , Ward, 
Koontz and Schroeder (1998), Ward, Schroeder, Barkley and Koontz (1996)) . Our statistic 
goes further, and looks at the possibility that packers may be able to "capture" an entire 
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feedlot , instead of just a port ion of the feedlot 's output. Finding an exclusive relationship 
between feed lots and packers would lend support to t his theory. It is important to note, 
however, that packer market power is only one of many possible reasons for such exclusive 
relationships. To address t his question , we perform the regression analysis described below. 
This measure is then calculated using a confidential data set collected by the USDA 
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) from four beef packing 
plants in a single region. The data was made available to us through a cooperative research 
agreement, and contains information on every purchase made by these packing plants over 
a I5-month period. To preserve confidentiality, only aggregate results are presented. 
Our results suggest that relationships between feedlots and packers are extremely exclu-
SIve. The majority of feedlots in our sample sell more than expected to only one of four 
neighboring packing plants. Furthermore, these feedlots on average sell only to their primary 
customers most periods in which they sell. 
In the paper's second section, we examine the switching behavior of feedlots in our data 
set . Feedlots n1ay have a single primary customer because this packer consistently offers the 
highest price. It is unlikely that any single plant will always offer the highest price, so that in 
a perfectly competitive market , absent transaction costs or other differences among feedlots , 
feedlot sales should regularly switch between plants. Thus, the more often feedlots switch 
customers, the more likely it is that the market is competitive, even when most feedlots have 
a single primary customer. We use a simple counting procedure to examine the number of 
periods feedlots with a single primary customer sold only to that packer. Relationships 
in this market are surprisingly stable. Over half of the feedlots examined sold only to 
their primary customer every time they entered the market. To further examine switching 
behavior, we calculate the percentage of throughput packers purchased from the feedlots that 
sold primarily to them. Close to half of packer throughput comes from these loyal feedlots. 
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Packer-feedlot relationships thus appear quite stable. 
While these results ilnply that packers may be exercising market power: the relationships 
found may also benefit feedlots . They may reduce transaction costs for both buyer and seller, 
leaving all parties better off. 2 To examine this question , we use regression analysis on the 
effect of lot quality characteristics and transaction costs on the relationships described above. 
If transaction costs and lot characteristics explain exclusivity, then both parties benefit from 
the market structure. While this would not rule out packer exercise of market power, it 
makes it difficult to characterize the effects as detrimental to feedlots. 
2 Describing Exclusive Relationships 
2.1 theory 
Our statistic is based on one developed by Brorsen, Bailey and Thomsen (1997), who look 
at the likelihood that a pen of cattle will be shipped from a given county to a particular 
marketing center.3 A county is defined as being in a trading center's primary market area 
if a larger percentage than expected of the lots sold from the county are shipped to the 
trading center. We modify this statistic to examine the likelihood that a given pen of cattle 
are sold from a particular feedlot to a particular packer. Suppose a region has K packing 
plants. If packers within the region are relatively close together, and assuming minimal 
price differentials, we would expect that over time a feedlot would sell approximately the 
same number of pens to each packer. That is, the likelihood of a given pen of cattle going to 
a particular packer would be 1/ K.4 Feedlots which sell more than 1/ J(ih of their total lots 
to a packer are said to have an exclusive relationship with that packer.5 A feedlot may have 
up to K - 1 exclusive (preferential) relationships, so that we can characterize the degree of 
overlap between packing plant suppliers. Presumably, the more exclusive relationships a 
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given feedlot has, the less control anyone of its custon1ers has over its sales . Also , the larger 
the number of feedlots with more than one exclusive relationship, the 1110re competitive the 
market is likely to be.6 
Problems arise when examining small feedlots, as they are more likely to have an exclusive 
relationship even when they sell the same number of lots to each of their customers.7 For 
example, in a market with four packing plants , a feedlot that sold three pens would have 
three (or fewer) exclusive relationships even if its sales were evenly divided. To obtain any 
information of use from these smaller feedlots, we use a smoothing teclmique developed by 
Brorsen et a1. (1997) to infer how a smaller feedlot would behave if it sold an average number 
of pens. 
In all of these formulas , p is the probability that a given lot is sold from feedlot i E {1..I} 
to packer k E {I. . K}. We define: 
as the probability that lot n is sold from feedlot i to packer k. Ni is the total number of 
sales made by feedlot i, and Yikn is one if lot n was sold from feedlot i to packer k. To handle 
problems with smaller feedlots, we include transactions from "nearby" feedlots. Thus, our 
smoothed estimate of the probability of shipment from feedlot i to packer k is a weighted 
average of fJ?k and fJ:k, the (possibly smoothed) probability of sales to packer k from feedlots 
adjacent to i. This is given by: 
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where 
if Ni < M and N i + Nt > M 
Nt is the total number of transactions the feedlots adjacent to i are involved in , and M is 
the number beyond which no smoothing is needed. 
An important step necessary for carrying out the above calculations is determining which 
feedlots to include in the smoothing statistic. Let d be the average distance between feedlots, 
and ()~ be the variance of these distances. 8 Feedlots closer than one standard deViation 
below d are defined as adjacent, since (assuming that distance between feedlots is normally 
distributed) there is only a 16% chance that feedlots will be closer to each other than this. 
We argue that transportation costs do not affect the probability of feedlots within d - () d 
miles of each other selling to anyone packer. 
Under the null hypothesis of a competitive market , Pik will equal 1/ K. Assuming that 
P:k = epik , there is no bias in our statistic if e = 1 (feedlot i and adjacent feedlots have the 
same transaction probabilities) or t = 0 (there is no smoothing). 
The central limit theorem applies if the number of observations is large enough. If we 
are testing whether Pik = 1/ K = 0.25, then 140 observations are sufficient for the following 
statistic to have an asymptotic standard normal distribution: 
where Po = Pik , (}~ik = Pik(1 - Pik)(Ni + t;Nj)/(Ni + tiNt)2. When the number of sales 
is not large enough to invoke the central limit theorem, we assume that e = 1 (i.e. that 
feedlot i and its neighbors are equally likely to ship to a given packer) and that lot sales are 
independent events and use the binomial distribution to determine the likelihood that Pik is 
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significantly different from 1/ K. 
This t est statistic allows for various values of Pik in testing for exclusivity. For eXaIl1ple, 
the researcher might wish to define a feedlot 's relationship with a packing plant as excl usi ve 
only if it ships over three-quarters of its output to that plant. In this case, Po = 0.75 would 
be used, and only those feedlots which sell statistically more than three-quarters of their 
pens to a given packer would be said to have an exclusive relationship with that packer. 
2.2 results 
We divided the feedlots into quintiles based upon number of lots sold. Feedlots in the lowest 
quintile sold only one or two lots over the entire 15-month period. As noted, calculating our 
test statistic for small feedlots may not be appropriate, since the proportion of sales going 
to anyone packer takes on a limited number of values. Since these feedlots tend to bias our 
results toward exclusivity, we perform our calculations with the lowest quintile deleted from 
the sample. When the smallest feedlots are included, we find much more exclusivity, even 
with the smoothing technique. 
The mean distance between feedlots was 191.4 miles, and the standard deviation about 
the mean was 128.5 miles. 9 Subtracting one standard deviation from the mean gives 62.9 
miles, and feedlots within this distance from each other were assumed adjacent.lO Since we 
are testing whether the probability of sale from a feedlot to a given packer is significantly 
greater than 25%, we invoke the central limit theorem for feedlots which (when combined 
with their neighbors) sold more than 140 lots. For smaller feedlots, we use the binomial 
distribution to determine the likelihood that Pik is significantly different from 25%. 
The smoothing procedure used assumes that nearby feedlots behave similarly, which 
contradicts the results (given below) suggesting that neighboring feedlots often have exclusive 
relationships with different packers. It is also not clear which "nearby" feedlots to include 
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in the weighting scheme. To avoid these problems, we also calculat e our st atistic without 
the snloot.hing procedure. When small feedlots' behavior is not adjusted for size, over 25% 
more feed lots have a single exclusive relationship (see Table 1). Feedlots making three or 
fewer sale; easily account for t his increase. 
Lot size may also affect our calculations. For exan1ple , if a feedlot sells many very small 
lots to a particular packer , we conclude it has an exclusive relationship with that packer , 
even when most of the cattle it handled went t o a second packer. To examine this issue, we 
calculated our statistic using number of head sold, rather than number of lots. 
Table 1 presents our results. They appear quite robust, since in all calculations the 
majority of feedlots had an exclusive relationship with a single packing plant. Additionally, 
we examined transactions in the spot and contract markets taken separately, and find that 
relationships are exclusive in both subsectors of the market. 
Insert Table 1 here 
3 feedlot switching behavior 
According to Gort (1963), if large firms compete vigorously for market share, instability in 
market shares ensures competitive behavior even when concentration is high. For example, 
a feedlot that sells most of its output to a single packer may regularly sell a small portion to 
other packers, or may have switched between primary customers one or more times during the 
period under observation. This idea was expanded upon by Davies and Geroski (1997) , and 
Baldwin and Gorecki (1994), who analyzed manufacturing industries in the U.K. and Canada 
and found that concentration and stability are not always positively correlated. Thus, an 
industry may be concentrated, but relationships between buyers and sellers so unstable that 
prices remain competitive. The statistic developed above may mask instability which limits 
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packers' ability to control their tern1S of purchase. 
To examine stability of this Inarket we divided our SaIllple into two-week periods , and 
calculated the percentage of periods feedlots with a single exclusive relationship sold only to 
their primary custonler. This is a nlore stringent test , as we now require 100% of sales to 
go to a primary customer, rather than statistically more than 25%. 
Insert Table 2 here 
For the overall market, the feedlots , on average, sell 80% of the time exclusively to their 
primary customer. In the contract and spot markets, feedlots sell exclusively to their primary 
customer 94% and 80% of the time, respectively. Most feedlots sell as much or more than 
the numbers shown above, as the median and mode in all cases are both larger than the 
mean. In fact , over half of all feedlots with a single exclusive relationship sold all of their 
output to their primary customer. These results give further evidence that feedlots tend to 
deal with a single packer exclusively, through contracts and in the spot market. 
This market appears to have both exclusive and stable relationships. However, table 
2 does not tell us if packers depend on their loyal feedlots for a large percentage of their 
throughput. One packer may buy all of its throughput from such loyal feedlots, while an-
other purchases only a limited amount from the feedlots that sell to it exclusively. In the 
first case, the relationship between packer and feedlot is likely to be one of mutual interde-
pendence, while in the second the packer may be better positioned to make purchase:> from 
secondary feedlots if its terms of sale are refused by its usual sellers. To get a sense of the 
interdependence of feedlots and packers, we calculated the percentage of its throughput each 
packer purchased from feedlots that sold it the majority of their output. On average, packers 
purchased just less than half (47%) of their throughput from feedlots at which they were 
the only primary customer. Not surprisingly, most of this exclusivity can be explained by 
contracted cattle. Just over three-quarters (76%) of the contracted throughput came from 
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these loyal feedlots, while only one quarter (26%) of spot n1arket throughput is purchased 
from loyal feedlots. 
4 Explaining the division of feedlots 
So far, we have seen that relationships in this data set are both exclusive and stable. \i\Thile 
these findings do not preclude the exercise of market power, n1any unrelated factors can 
explain the relationships found. Indeed, we saw above that almost half of packer throughput 
(47%) is purchased from loyal feedlots, which suggests some dependence on regular suppliers. 
Next, we create a regression equation to explain the stability and exclusivity found in packer-
feedlot relationships.ll 
4.1 estimating the bids 
To consider the effect of prices offered from all packers on the proportion sold to a particular 
packer, we must estimate the value of unsuccessful bids. Jones, Schroeder, Mintert and 
Brazle (1992), Fawson, Bailey and Glover (1996), and Feuz (1999) suggest that bid prices 
are determined by quality characteristics of the cattle and the influences of supply and 
demand in the market. Thus, we divided our sample into two-week periods and estimated 
the effect on bids of various lot characteristics, distance from the feedlot to the packing 
plant and packing plant capacity, using data on accepted bids. We then use our parameter 
estimates to calculate fitted values for failed bids in each of the 33 two-week periods. The 
buyers' bid equations are given by: 12 
B I D ijnt aOjt + !3jltDIS Tij + !3j2t DI S~~ + !3j3tH EA Dn + !3 j4t H EAD~ 
5 
+!3j5tFUTU RESnk + L IjmtYG%mn + Ij5t C HOICE% 
m=2 
+'j6t M I X EDn + Ij7tC ARC AS Sn + ' j8t DAI RYn 
4 
+'j9tHEIFERS + L Ojk CAFjk + Cijnt 
j= 1 
11 
(1 ) 
where BI Dijnt is the bid accepted by the ith feedlot (i = 1, ... , 208) from the lhpacker 
(j = 1,2,3,4) for the nth lot offered during the two-week period t (t = 1, 2, ... , 33) , DISTij 
is the distance in linear miles from the i th feedlot to the lh packer , HEAD is the nUln ber of 
head in the lot, FUTU RESnk is the closing price for the nearby live cattle futures contract 
on the date when the nth lot of cattle was killed (k) , YG%mn is the percentage of t he cattle 
in the nth lot falling into the mth yield grade category, with yield grade 1 serving as the base 
(m = 2, 3, 4, 5). CHOICE% is the percentage of the lot that graded choice. M I X ED is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the lot is a mixture of steers and heifers. C ARCASS is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the lot was priced on a carcass basis. D AI RY is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the cattle were a dairy breed, and Cijnt is a random error term. We index each 
bid by feedlot (i), packer (j), lot id number (n) and two week period of sale (t).13 Because 
bids for each packer are estimated separately, no packer dummy is necessary. 
Table 3 gives the parameter estimates for equation 1. These results give average, max-
imum and minimum coefficients from the 31 regression equations (one for each two-week 
period). The average parameter estimates appear to be consistent with theory and results 
reported in other studies. The averge parameter estimates for DI ST and DI S T 2 suggest 
that these packers price discriminate against distant sellers. This is not surprising given that 
competition for cattle is expected to be most keen when cattle are close to more t han one 
12 
packer. k3 lot size increases , price increases at a decreasing rate (HEAD and H E AD 2).14 
The nearby li ve catt le fut ures contract (FUTURES) has a positive impact on cash prices , 
on average, indicating t hat local cash prices adjust at least partially to outside market in-
fonnation. Premiums are paid on average for yield grade 2 and 3 cattle, as well as cattle 
that will grade choice (YG2%, YG3%, YG4%, YG5% and CHOICE). Selling cattle on a 
carcass basis (CARCASS) appears to reduce average price suggesting that live pricing is 
biased upward. Cattle sold in mixed lots of steers and heifers (MIX ED) , and in lots of 
only heifers (H EI F ERS) are discounted as expected. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Ward (1993) and Purcell (1990) indicate that meat packing has large economies of scale. 
Consequently, packers benefit by operating plants at large scale. Ceteris paribus packers 
should pay higher prices when operating at low capacity, so that the coefficients on CAPjk , 
the percentage of full capacity of the ph packer on the nth lot's slaughter date (day k) should 
be negative. While packer capacity may affect the proportion of spot market sales from 
feedlot i to packer j, it seems likely that this effect comes through prices. Thus, we include 
plant capacity here, rather than in the main regression discussed below. 
------Since capacity is endogenous, we instrument for it in equation 1 with C APjk : 
4 
CMjk = Ao + L AjCA~,k_1 + A5 SA1jk + JLjk 
j=1 
S AT is equal to 1 if the observation was for a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. We replace 
--CAPjk with CAPjk , and estimate equation 1 using ordinary least squares. Coefficients in 
equation 1 were replaced with their estimated values to calculate ifibijxnt , the (estimated) 
bid the cattle might have received had they been sold to packer x (x = {I , 2,3 , 4} , x =I- j) . 
Where x = j , ifib was the actual bid. ------BI D is restricted to be positive , since prices are 
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posit ive. Additionally: B I D was restricted to be wit hin two standard devia tions of the 
lnean bid. to control for the vel')' few unreasonably large est ilTlates. The average difference 
between successful and unsuccessful bids for each time period (t) was then calculated as 
fo llows: 
--P DI Fijxt = BI Dijt - BI Dijxt (2) 
where P D IF is the average pr ice difference for two-week period t between what feedlot i 
received fronl packer j and what it might have received from packer X .15 The calculated 
price differences are omitted for reasons of confidentiality. We can report that estimated 
price differences are all positive and fairly small (less than $5 per cwt) , none are statistically 
different from zero, and approximately half of actual prices exceed predicted prices. 
4.2 factors influencing market stability and exclusivity 
In a perfectly competitive market , feedlot operators should adjust sales based on the cash 
price t hat each packer offers (ifibijXnt ). However, transaction costs may affect sale pro-
por tions. Since these are not observable, we proxy for them and include estimated price 
differences in the following estimating equation: 
PROPijt <Po + <pIPRO~jt-l + <p2I~jt + <P3FLSIZEit + 
4 
<P4TOTLOTt + L LWjxDjPDIFijxt + 
j=1 xi-j 
3 
+<P5PERSISTit + <P6CSijt + L 'l/;jDj + ~ijt 
j = 1 
(3) 
where P RORjt is the proportion of lots sold in the spot market by the ith feedlot to the /h 
packer during the tth two-week period (only spot sales are considered since we assume that 
short- term adjustments cannot be made in the proportion of cattle sold under contract) . 
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PRO ~jt- l controls for the effect of previous dealings on packer-feedlot relationships, and 
measures the (transaction) cost of finding differellt exchange partners. If it is important , 
its coefficient will be positive and significant. 
The binary variable I R ijt is used to examine whether or not proportions tend to be 
"sticky" downward (reductions in proportions are smaller than increases in proportions sold 
to a particular packer). This is similar to irreversibility as discussed in Ferris (1998). It 
measures rigidity in the market , and is related to the transaction cost of finding a new trading 
partner. We hypothesize that this cost makes relationships more stable than they otherwise 
would be. If the adjustment in proportions is asymetric downward, then I Rjt will have a 
negative, significant coefficent. 
F LSI ZEit is the total number of lots sold by the ith feedlot in both the spot and contract 
markets during period t. Feedlot size is related to (transaction) costs of negotiating a sale, as 
economies of size in developing and maintaining relationships may reduce per pen transaction 
costs. If this is true then F LS I ZEit will have a positive, significant coefficient. 
The variables Dj P D I F ijxt represent the differences in actual prices paid by packer j and 
what could have been received from the three other packers. We expect the coefficients on 
these variables to be positive and significant. The Djs are dummy variables used to ensure 
that only price differences involving packer j are used to explain the proportion of feedlot 
output sold to packer j. 
One possibility is that relationships are stable because price differences are small and 
feedlot operators fear retaliation if they reject a regular buyer's bid to accept a slightly 
higher bid from another buyer. To test for the possibility of retaliation (a transaction 
cost related to monitoring and enforcing implicit agreements) we included PERSISTib a 
binary variable set to one if any competing packer has offered $3/ cwt more for two or more 
consecutive (two-week) periods. If persistent price differences affect the proportion of sales 
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going to a given packer , the coefficient on P ERSI SI:t will be negative and significant. 16 
Based on the notion that retaliation is less cos tly for packers during perio ds of high supply 
we included the number of cattle offered for sale in the market each p eriod, TOT LOT St· 
If feedlot operators fear retaliation from their primary customers for reducing their sales , 
they are more likely to do so during periods of large supplies , when the cost to packers is 
diminished. Additionally, since it is less costly to punish feedlots during periods of large 
supply, packers may reduce the amount they purchase from disloyal feedlots when cattle are 
abundant. Thus, the coefficient on TOT LOT St should be negative and significant. 
Finally, we expect that costs for completing spot market transactions are reduced if the 
feedlot operator sells to the packer under contract. This is related to transaction costs of 
finding a trading partner and bargaining over the terms of trade . Contract sales imply that 
the feedlot and the packer have some degree of trust in their business relationship. CSijt , the 
proportion of all contract sales of the ith feedlot during time period t sold to packer j should 
thus have a significantly positive coefficient. To account for packer-specific characteristics 
not included elsewhere, we include three dummy variables D j , with the fourth packer serving 
as the base. Summary statistics for our regressors are given in table 4. 
Insert Table 4 here 
The results for the Hausman test for random effects and the F-test for fixed effects 
indicate that a fixed effects model is appropriate. This procedure was used to estimate 
equation 3, and parameter estimates are reported in table 5. 
Insert Table 5 here 
Our results support the notion that relationships between feedlots and packers are quite 
stable. The coefficient for lagged spot market sales (PRO~jt - l) is significantly different 
than zero and positive. Upward adjustments in proportions from one time period to the 
16 
next tend to be larger than downward adjustments (I Rijt). This implies one-way rigidity in 
these relat ionships . The coeffi cient for feedlot size (F L S I ZEit ) is posit ive and significantly 
different than zero, suggesting that larger feedlots tend to sell larger proportions of t heir cat-
tle t o packers. It appears that economies of size exist in the est ablishment and maintenance 
of relationships. Surprisingly, a larger proportion of contract sales from feedlot i to packer 
j (C Sijt) reduces the portion of spot market transactions between them. This might be 
because packers rely on different feedlots for spot market transactions than for contracted 
cattle. Alternatively, it could be that feedlots that contract their cattle simply sell very 
little on the spot market. 
The results on price differences are mixed, with all estimates being quite small , and half 
not significantly different from zero. These coefficients should be positive and significant if 
the market is competitive. Consistent with our results above, this market does not appear to 
be perfectly competitive, since differences in offered prices do not have a strong relationship 
wi th shifts in proportions sold to each packer. 
Even persistent price differences lead to an insignificant adjustment in proportions sold 
to each packer, as the coefficient on PERSISTit is not significantly different from zero. 
Possible reasons for these results include transaction costs that make pursuing relatively 
small price differences unprofitable or the threat of retaliation that makes small short-run 
payoffs unprofitable. However, our results provide limited statistical evidence that the 
proportions feedlots sell to individual packers change significantly during periods of relatively 
heavy supply, as the coefficient on the size of the market (TOT LOT St) is not significantly 
different from zero. 
Our results indicate that neither current price nor persistent price differences influence 
the proportion of sales between feedlots and each packing plant (as they would in a perfectly 
competitive market). Instead, previous spot market sales , the size of the feedlot and the 
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presence (or absellce) of a contracting relationship appear to affect the proportion of spot 
Inarket sales. The results imply that transaction costs are a major reason why feedlots and 
packers establish and Inaintain stable relationships. 17 While it is reasonable to conclude that 
this market departs from the standard perfectly competitive model (where price is the only 
determinant of market exchanges), this may be because the perfectly competitive model is not 
well suited to addressing issues of relationship stability and transaction costs. Additionally, 
we cannot necessarily conclude that packers are taking advantage of their position, SInce 
reducing transaction costs may benefit both the feedlot and the packer. 
5 Conclusion and Extensions 
This paper suggests that alternative measures of market power are warranted in study of 
the beef packing industry. We propose two measures based on easily quantifiable , albeit 
not readily available, data. Inasmuch as our evidence does not rely on hard- to- measure 
variables, it may allow for more definitive conclusions regarding whether concern about the 
structure of the beef packing market is justified. 
Our first measure classifies packer-feedlot relationships as exclusive when a feedlot sells 
an unusually large proportion of its output to a single packer. In a competitive market 
observed over time, feedlots should sell approximately the same proportions to all packers 
in the area. Feedlots which sell more to a particular packer are said to have an exclusive 
relationship with that packer. Over half of the feedlots in our sample have an exclusive 
relationship with a single packer. Our second measure is more stringent, as it uses the 
criterion of all sales going to the primary customer. We divide our data set into two-week 
periods , and examine the percentage of two-week periods a feedlot with a single exclusive 
relationship sold only to its primary custmer. Again, our results suggest that the market for 
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fed beef which we examined is not perfectly competitive, since over half of all feedlots with 
a single exclusive relationship always sell to their prilnary customer exclusively. However , 
this dependence 111ay be n1utual, as packers purchase just under half of their throughput 
fronl these feedlots . 
Of course packers n1ay have exclusive relationships with feedlots for many reasons not 
related to the exercise of market power. In the paper's third section, we discuss some of these 
reasons , and develop a regression model designed to control for many of them. Variables 
proxying for transaction costs explain much of the variation in percentage of spot market 
sales going to each packer. Previous proportions, the presence of a contracting relationship 
and the one-sided nature of changes in proportions (increases in proportions sold to a given 
packer are much larger than decreases in proportions sold) have the largest influence on spot 
market proportions. Price differences , even persistent price differences do not appear to have 
a large or significant effect on how much a feedlot sells to each packer. However, our analysis 
relied on estimated bids. Additional data on failed bids might be helpful in resolving the 
relationship between price differences and proportions sold. Feedlots may benefit as much 
as packers do from the stability and exclusivity found in relationships. 
It would be interesting to use these measures in other industries, to examine alterna-
tive ways that firms exercise market power. These measures have the advantage of being 
straightforward and simple to calculate, when appropriate data exists. In this sense, they 
allow one to draw conclusions about market power without being subject to hard-to-evaluate 
elastici ty estimates from outside the model. They are thus useful additions to the set of 
tools used to examine market power. 
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·See Schroeter (1987) for a theoretical development of the standard measure of market power. 
2For exa.mple. feedlot.s may have a particular packer's pricing grid in mind as th~y pllrcha..''€ and finish 
their cattle. This reduction ill co::;t of tinding a buyer and negot.iating price may explain the exclusive and 
stable relationships seen in t.he da.ta. 
3See Zhang and Sexton (2000) for an application of the literature on spatial market competition to beef 
packing. Our work does not directly consider this spatial price discrimination. Instead, we study the 
possibility of geographic division of feedlots among packers and the effects of this division on input prices. 
4 The choice of 1/ K follows the work of Brorsen et a1. (1997). It assumes that all plants are equally likely 
to purchase a given pen of cattle. It has been suggested that if one of the plants is much larger than others 
in the area, feedlots would sell more than 1/ Kth of their output to this plant. We have done preliminary 
calculations in which the definition of exclusive relationship depends on plant size, but these do not appear 
to affect our results. Further, as we will see in table 2 below, it appears that feedlots with a single exclusive 
relationship sell almost all of their output (much more than 1/ Kth) to their primary buyer, which implies 
that the results presented are robust to the definition of exclusivity we have selected. 
SSince the statistic developed requires only that packers sell more than 25% of their output to a single 
packer, one might describe relationships in this market as preferential, rather than exclusive. However , as 
we will see below, most feedlots sell far more than 25% of their output to a single packer. Thus, we continue 
to describe packer-feedlot relationships as "exclusive". 
6It has been suggested that some exclusive relationships between feedlots and particular packers may 
force other exclusive relationships between other feedlots and packers. For example, if three-fourths of all 
the feedlots in an area all have exclusive relationships with three out of four packers in that area, then the 
only way the fourth packer could ensure adequate supply to meet its capacity would be to establish its own 
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exclusive relationships with the remaining fourth of the feedlots in that area. The data available to us do 
not allow us to test for this sort of causality, although it should be noted . 
7 Our data are from feedlots making at least one sale to one of these four packing plants within the 
fifteen-month period. Unfortunately, we cannot completely categorize feedlot size, as only sales to these four 
packing plant.s a.r~ included . 1-=(~edl(Jts IlI ,I\" sell prilllarily ill;tll outside 111 ,u' k('t alld (lId.,' illit('<j l\('lllh' Iu t\t(~e 
packers . \\·llidl CllIlld LIIIS{' d l)i ;l:-; SillC\ ' (If S(IIIII ' 1'('('(1 1(1\ :-- ' l\l]>I' ;lr SIII ;III \\ ·111 ' 11 111 1" .I r'· Ih .1 
8We were able to calclllate t.he di st.a.lIC(~ /wI ween J(( :cllo/,:-; Iwcallsc I. he (L'ILl scI i lid ll<i( 'd !at it Ilde a lld 
longitude coordillatc."-i [or C\'ery feedlot. 
9Twelve feedlots were more than 2 st.a.ndard devifl.t.inlls (2[) 7 miles) [Will all nt \tel's. a!lel t hilS "arljacent" 
to no one. These were removed from the sample. along with two feedlots missillg coordinat.e dat.a. 
lOUsing two alternative definitions of "adjacent" - feedlots within 50 and 100 miles o[ the one under 
examination did not significantly affect our results. 
11 We consider only the 210 feedlots with a single exclusive relationship. Two of these feedlots were 
excluded because they did not sell until the last few days of the IS-month period and our regressions use 
two-week averages. ThlLs , our data set is a panel of 208 feedlots observed over 3:3 two-week periods. 
12 All variables except CAPjJ~ are included in the USDA, CIPSA dat.a set used throughout this paper. 
CAPjk specifies the percent of maximum capacity at which the packing plant is operating on a particular 
day. 11aximum capacity was defined as the largest number of cattle slaught.ered at the plant on a single day 
during the study period. Although cattle are not typically killed t.he same day they are purchased (priced) 
we assume that buyers can predict the effect of each purchase on slaughter dat.e processing costs. 
13The index n is distinct for each lot sold during the 15-month period, so that indexing BID by n alone 
is sufficient to identify it. We believe that adding j, k and t make the model easier to follow and thus err 
on the side of redundancy. 
14 Average parameter estimates suggest the optimum lot size is approximately 400 head, ceterius paribus. 
150ur time period is two weeks to allow enough degrees of freedom to estimate equation 1. 
16 P DI F measures the difference between the actual purchase price and the estimated prices offered by 
competing packers . Thus, a negative P D IF signifies higher offers that were not accepted. 
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17 This is supported by the residuals of the entire regression. Our adjusted R2 indicates that approximately 
75% of the variation in proportions so ld to a particular packer is explained by the variables included. 
Tablel: Exclusive Relationships Between Feedlots and Packers 
All Feedlots (number in the market) 62.9 miles Excluding Small Feedlots (number in the market) 62.9 miles 
Spot Market Contract Market Entire Market Spot Market Contract Market Entire Market 
(311 ) (150) (335) (260) (145) (279) 
No. Pet. No. Pet. No. Pet. No. Pet. No. Pet. No. Pet. 
Smoothed 
None 51 16.40 27 18.00 42 12.34 34 13.08 24 16.55 33 11.83 
One 183 58.84 83 55.33 209 62.39 149 57.31 81 55.86 162 58.06 
Two 66 21.22 31 20.67 76 22.69 66 25.38 31 21.38 76 27.24 
Three 11 3.54 9 6.00 8 2.39 11 4.23 9 6.21 8 2.87 
Unsmoothed 
None 4 1.29 2 1.33 4 l.19 0.38 2 1.38 0.36 
One 266 85.53 137 9l.33 295 88.06 218 83.85 132 9l.03 242 86 .74 
Two 41 13.18 11 7.33 36 10.75 41 15.77 11 7.59 36 12.90 
Three 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
# Head 
None 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
One 239 76.85 135 90.99 263 78.51 189 72.69 130 89.66 208 74.55 
Two 69 22.19 15 10.00 68 20.30 68 26.15 15 10.34 67 24.01 
Three 3 0.96 0 0.00 4 l.19 3 l.15 0 0.00 4 1.43 N VI 
Table 2: Percentage of Periods Feedlots Sell Only to Primary Customer 
Average 
Median 
Standard Deviation 
Overall Market 
80% 
100% 
30% 
Spot Market 
94% 
1000/0 
23% 
Contract Market 
80% 
100% 
31% 
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Table 3. Statistics for Parameter Estimates for Bid Model (Equation (1)) 
Variable Average % of Times Minimum Maximum 
Parameter Significant 
Estimate @ 10 % level 
Intercept 54.375 50.00 -1808.660 1830.070 
DIST 7.490£-5 46.21 -0 .0001 0.0001 
DISr -2.020£-6 42.42 -0.0001 0.0001 
HEAD 0.0020 24.24 -0.0096 0.0151 
HEAD2 
-2 .328E-6 15.91 -2.080£-5 1.480£-5 
FUTURES 0.1957 56.06 -2.9580 5.2805 
YG2% 0.0066 35.61 -0.1075 0.0946 
YG3% 0.0098 35.61 -0.0588 0.0842 
YG4% -0.0189 23.48 -0.2730 0.1881 
YG5% -0.1402 13.74 -6.0071 2.6470 
CHOICE% 0.0104 39.39 -0.0251 0.0587 
MIXED -0.4410 35.94 -3.4840 1.8880 
CARCASS -1.3780 73.85 -6.2240 2.8260 
DAIRY -1.8760 95.45 -9.0460 0.0000 
HEIFERS -0.2011 28.79 -1.9610 0.8727 
Adjusted R 2: Maximwn 0.7792 Average 0.4725 
Minimwn 0.0530 Median 0.5034 
The percentage of capacity at which each plant was operating (CAP 1 through CAP4) was 
also included in this regression. Coefficients on these variables are not reported to 
preserve confidentiality. Some variables, such as Dairy, were not present each time 
period. Percentages are more telling in these situations. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Regressors Other Than Price 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Irreversibility 0.18 0.39 0 
Lagged Spot Market Sales 0.25 0.38 0 
Size of Feedlot 7.33 8.22 72 
Size of Market 892.00 78.61 761 1073 
Persistent Price Differences 0.05 0.22 0 
Percent Contract Sales 0.06 0.22 0 
Nun1ber of observations for all variables = 15,324 
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Table 5: Regression Results, Dependent Variable = % Spot Market Sales to Packer 
Variable Price 
Differences 
Intercept -0.0342 pdifl 0.0008 
(0.1181) (O.OOOS) 
Irreversibility -0.4209 pdif2 0.0003 
(I Rijt) (0.00S7)** (0.0004) 
Lagged Spot Market Sales 0.4282 pdif3 0.0003 
(PROPijt_l ) (0.0081)** (O.OOOS) 
Size of Feedlot 0.0012 pdif4 -6.S96 x E-5 
(FLSIZEit) (0.0004)** (O.OOOS) 
Size of Market 2.995 x E-5 pdif5 0.0013 
(TOTLOTS,) (2.136 x E-5) (0.0004)** 
Persistence -0.0099 pdif6 0.0020 
(PERSISTit) (0.0083) (O.OOOS)** 
Percent Contract Sales -0.020S pdif7 0.0008 
(CSijt) (0.0098)* (O.OOOS)t 
pdif8 .0013 
(O.OOOS)** 
pdif9 0.0010 
(O.OOOS)* 
pdiflO 0.0004 
(0.0005) 
pdifl1 0.0011 
(O.OOOS)* 
Adjusted R2 0.73 pdifl2 0.0019 
(0.0004)** 
Coefficients on packer-specific variables (Dj ) are not reported to preserve confidentiality 
Hausman test statistic for random effects: 754.81 
F-test statistic for fixed effects: 9.08 
Standard errors given in parentheses 
tsignificant at 100/0 *significant at 5% * * significant at 1 % 
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Measuring Market Power With Variables Other Than 
Price 
1 Introduction 
Concentration in the beef packing industry has been rising for the past 25 years. This has 
generated both concern among policymakers and interest from academic economists about 
the ability of packing plants to exploit their market position by influencing the conditions 
under which they purchase live cattle. Several studies of oligopsony power in beef packing 
have led to mixed results (see Azzam (1998) for an overview of this literature). Some 
studies find a small but significant degree of market power (Bhuyan and Lopez (1997) , 
Koontz, Garcia and Hudson (1993) , Schroeter (1987) , Schroeter and Azzam (1990)) , while 
others find no evidence that packers are able to exploit their position in the purchase of fed 
cattle (Azzam and Park (1993), Morrison (1997) , Muth and Wohlgenant (1998)) . 
In most studies , exercise of market power is defined as the ability of packing firms to re-
duce the price they pay for their inputs below a competitive level. 1 Unfortunately, without 
further assumptions, one cannot know what prices would be if the industry were "com-
petitive." Most studies solve this problem by noting that packer costs determine what a 
competitive level of prices would be. They then use an estimate of costs based on input 
prices paid, processing costs, and marginal value product. However, as is well known, costs 
and marginal value product are quite difficult to measure accurately, let alone obtain from 
packing firms. Alternatively, some studies examine the path of prices over time, looking for 
collusive behavior among packing firms (see, for example, Koontz et al. (1993) , Weliwita and 
Azzam (1996), Azzam and Park (1993)). However, these studies are not able to characterize 
the degree of market power which packers may possess, since they do not involve estimating 
1 
Notes 
I See Sclu'oet er (1987) [or a theoret ical development of the standard measure of market power. 
2For example, feedlots may have a particular packer 's pricing grid in mind as they purchase and finish 
their catt le . This reduction in cost of finding a buyer and negotiating price may explain the exclusive and 
stable relationships seen in the data. 
3See Zhang and Sexton (2000) for an application of the literature on spatial market competition to beef 
packing. Our work does not directly consider this spatial price discrimination. Instead , we study the 
possibility of geographic division of feedlots among packers and the effects of this division on input prices. 
4The choice of 1/ K follows the work of Brorsen et a1. (1997). It assumes that all plants are equally likely 
to purchase a given pen of catt le. It has been suggested that if one of the plants is much larger than others 
in the area, feedlots would sell more than I/Kth of their output to this plant. We have done preliminary 
calculations in which the defini tion of exclusive relationship depends on plant size, but these do not appear 
to affect our results. Further , as we will see in table 2 below, it appears that feedlots with a single excl usive 
relationship sell almost all of their output (much more than 1/ Kth) to their primary buyer, which implies 
that the results presented are robust to the definition of exclusivity we have selected. 
5Since the statistic developed requires only that packers sell more than 25% of their output to a single 
packer , one might describe relationships in this market as preferential , rather than exclusive. However , as 
we will see below, most feedlots sell far more than 25% of their output to a single packer. Thus , we continue 
to describe packer-feedlot relationships as "exclusive". 
6It has been suggested that some exclusive relationships between feedlots and particular packers may 
force other exclusive relationships between other feedlots and packers. For example, if three-fourths of all 
the feedlots in an area all have exclusive relationships with three out of four packers in that area, then the 
only way the fourth packer could ensure adequate supply to meet its capacity would be to establish its own 
exclusive relationships with the remaining fourth of the feedlots in that area. The data available to us do 
not allow us to test for this sort of causality, although it should be noted. 
7 Our data are from feedlots making at least one sale to one of these four packing plants within the 
fifteen-month period. Unfortunately, we cannot completely categorize feedlot size, as only sales to these four 
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packing plants are included. Feedlots may sell primarily in an outside market and only infreq uent.ly to these 
packers) which could calLse a bias s ince of SOll1e feedlots ap pear small "'hen the.\· are n o t. 
8We were able to calculate the distances between feedlots because the data set incl uded latitude and 
longitude coordinates for every feedlot. 
9Twelve feedlots were more than 2 standard deviations (257 miles) from a ll others. a nd thus "adjacent" 
to no one. These were removed from the sample , along with two feedlots missing coordinate data. 
lOUsing two alternative definitions of "adjacent" - feedlots within 50 and 100 miles of the one under 
examination did not significantly affect our results. 
11 We consider only the 210 feedlots with a single exclusive relationship. Two of these feedlots were 
excluded because they did not sell until the last few days of the 15-month period and our regressions use 
two-week averages. Thus , our data set is a panel of 208 feedlots observed over 33 two-week periods. 
12 All variables except CAPjk are included in the USDA, CIPSA data set used throughout this paper. 
CAPjk specifies the percent of maximum capacity at which the packing plant is operating on a particular 
day. 1tlaximum capacity was defined as the largest number of cattle slaughtered at the plant on a single day 
during the study period. Although cattle are not typically killed the same day they are purchased (priced) 
we assume that buyers can predict the effect of each purchase on slaughter date processing costs. 
13The index n is distinct for each lot sold during the 15-·month period, so that indexing BID by n alone 
is sufficient to identify it. We believe that adding j , k and t make the model easier to follow and thus err 
on the side of redundancy. 
14 Average parameter estimates suggest the optimum lot size is approximately 400 head, ceterius paribus. 
15 Our time period is two weeks to allow enough degrees of freedom to estimate equation 1. 
16 P DI F measures the difference between the actual purchase price and the estimated prices offered by 
competing packers. Thus , a negative PDIF signifies higher offers that were not accepted. 
17 This is supported by the residuals of the entire regression. Our adjusted. R2 indicates that approximately 
75% of the variation in proportions sold to a particular packer is explained by the variables included. 
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